In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, attackers are continuously exploring innovative techniques to outsmart security products and their detection mechanisms. This presentation offers a comprehensive exploration into a novel approach – the de-optimization of compiler-generated machine code instructions – to bypass security products without resorting to conventional evasion techniques.
The talk delves into how we can use mathematical methods such as arithmetic partitioning, logical inverse, polinomial ditribution, and logical partitioning, for re-creating the target binary by transforming its instructions. Through these mathematical approaches, the speaker demonstrates the capability to mutate or transform approximately 95% of the instructions, presenting a significant challenge to traditional static rule-based detection mechanisms employed by security products.
Notably, this presentation introduces a paradigm shift by showcasing the effectiveness of de-optimization tricks in circumventing security measures without the reliance on self-modifying code and Read-Write-Execute (RWE) memory regions. Attendees will gain a deep understanding of the intricacies involved in the de-optimization process and how these techniques can be strategically employed to evade detection.